History of CAT
In
the history of CAT,
three core issues come
up – one of which was about the writ jurisdiction of the High
Courts. Another was the issue regarding the disposal of cases by a
Single Member Bench.
The validity of the
Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of India........... whereby
the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised the theory that the
Administrative Tribunals shall be an effective substitute for the
High Courts. However, the theory was discountenanced by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in various subsequent decisions and the matter came to
be reviewed by the Constitutional Bench before the Supreme Court of
India in L. Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India JT
1997(3) SC – 589.who
repudiated the theory in so far as taking away the power of the High
Courts to hear writ appeals filed before itself against the orders of
the Administrative Tribunals under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. Their Lordships held that the power of
judicial review by the High Courts within their territorial
jurisdiction is under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and it
is one of the basic features of the Constitution which cannot be
taken away by way of an amendment or enactment by the Parliament.
However, their Lordships qualified by propounding that only a
Division Bench in the High Court can undertake a judicial review of
the decisions rendered by the Administrative Tribunals.
In Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of
India which is one of the earliest cases, it was held that
in the case of recruitment to the Central Administrative Tribunal the
appropriate course would be to appoint a High Powered Selection
Committee headed by a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court to be
nominated by the Chief Justice of India, while in the case of
recruitment to the State Administrative Tribunals the High Powered
Selection Committee should be headed by a sitting Judge of the High
Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court
concerned. It was
further held an
Advocate who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court should also
be regarded as eligible as a member of CAT,
But
most important part of Sampat kumar vs. union of India judgement was
that the Supreme Court upheld the validity of art. 323-A and of the
Act itself as the necessary changes suggested by the court were
incorporated in the Administrative Tribunal Act. The
Bench held that the Service Tribunals created under Article 323-A
are substitutes to the High Courts and the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of High Courts is legal.
In
a landmark judgment in L.Chandra kumar vs. union of India (AIR 1997
SC 1125) a seven-member constitutional bench of the supreme court has
unanimously while reconsidering the SAMPATH KUMAR'S CASE, has struck
down clause 2(d) of articles 323A and clause 3(d) pf art. 323B which
provided for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the high courts
under articles 226 and 227 and the Supreme Court under article 32 of
the constitution as unconstitutional and invalid as they damage the
power of judicial review which is the basic structure of the
constitution.
but
also held that, the Tribunals are supplementary in their role and the
power of 'Judicial Review' vested in High Courts and Supreme Court
under Articles 226, 227 and 32 is an inviolable basic structure of
the Constitution and struck down clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and
clause 3(d) of Article 323-B of the Constitution of India to the
extent they exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts and Supreme Court
under Articles 226/227 and 32 as unconstitutional and also Section 28
of the 'Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985' which excludes the
jurisdiction of High Courts.
�To
this end, it is suggested that the Tribunals be made subject to the
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court within whose territorial
jurisdiction they fall. We are, however, of the view that this
may not be the best way of solving the problem. We do not think
that our Constitutional scheme requires that all adjudicating bodies
which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts
should be subject to their supervisory jurisdiction. If the
idea is to divest the High Courts of their onerous burdens, then
adding to their supervisory functions cannot in any manner, be of
assistance to them�.
While
rejecting the said plea as indicated above, the Apex Court suggested
for creation of 'Single Umbrella organisation' to over see the
functioning of the Tribunals in the country.
A second
issue that came up before the Apex Court again and again deals with
the validity of the judgments passed by a Single Member Bench. In
this regard, Section 5(6) of the Act is important which reads
"(6) Notwithstanding
anything contained in the foregoing provisions of the section, it
shall be competent for the Chairman or any other Member authorized by
the Chairman in this behalf to function as [a Bench] consisting of a
single Member and exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority of
the Tribunal in respect of such classes of cases of such matters or
such matters pertaining to such classes of cases as the Chairman may
by general or special order specify.
Provided that if at any stage
of the hearing of any such case or matter, it appears to the Chairman
or such Member that the case or matter is of such a nature that it
ought to be heard by a Bench consisting [two Members], the case or
matter may be transferred by the Chairman or as the case may be,
referred to him for transfer to such Bench as the Chairman may deem
fit."
While examining the position
of Section 5(6), it is opined by Shri Shankar Raju, (Judicial Member
CAT) -- “It is no more res Integra that Section 5 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 mutatis mutandis applies to the
State Administrative Tribunals in the State.” Thus the chairman of
CAT as well as any State tribunal has powers to send matters to a
single member bench but subject to the proviso as above.
It has been held again and
again that Section 5 of the A.T. Act does not distinguish between
Judicial and Administrative Members in the matter of jurisdiction,
powers and authority to be exercised by the Benches.
At the same time, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court also dispelled the contentions raised from various
quarters about advisability of appointing the Administrative Members
on these Tribunals and held that (a) there is no illegality in the
appointment of the Administrative Members and (b) the Administrative
Tribunals are competent to decide the constitutional validity of any
statutory provision except in so far as it relates to the statutory
provisions of its own Act under which the Hon'ble Members have been
appointed.
Earliest, in the Dr. Mahabal
Ram's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed the following:
"6. Sub-sections (2) and
(6) appearing as limbs of the same section have to be harmoniously
construed. There is no doubt that what has been said in Sampath Kumar
case would required safeguarding the interest of litigants in the
matter of disposal of their disputes in a judicious way. Where
complex questions of law would be involved the dispute would require
serious consideration and thorough examination. There would, however,
he many cases before the Tribunal where very often no constitutional
issues or even legal points would be involved. Mr. Ramamurthi, Senior
Counsel suggested to us in course of the hearing that keeping the
principles indicated in the Constitutional Bench judgment in view,
the single Member contemplated under sub-section (6) should be meant
to cover a judicial member only. That view perhaps not be appropriate
to adopt. On the other hand, we are prepared to safeguard the
interests of claimants who go before the Tribunal by holding that
while allocating work to the Single Member – whether judicial or
administrative – in terms of sub-section (6), the Chairman should
keep in view the nature of the litigation and where questions of law
and for interpretation of constitutional provisions are involved they
should not be assigned to a Single Member. In fact, the proviso
itself indicates Parliament's concern to safeguard the interest of
claimants by casting an obligation on the Chairman and Members who
hear the cases to refer to a regular bench of two members such cases
which in their opinion require to be heard by a bench of two Members.
We would like to add that it would be open to either party appearing
before a Single Member to suggest to the Member hearing the matter
that it should to a bench of two Members. The Member should
ordinarily allow the matter to go a bench of two Members when so
requested. This would sufficiently protect the interests of the
claimants and even of the administrative system whose litigations may
be before the Single Member for disposal. To make a distinction
between Judicial Member and Administrative Member functioning under
Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act may not be appropriate and,
therefore, we have not been able to accept the approach suggested by
Mr. Ramamurthi. The observation made in the two-judge Bench case that
no provision was cited to them that a Single Member could hear cases
laid before the Tribunal led to the conclusion that the judicial
business of the Administrative Tribunal was intended to be carried
out by a bench of two Members. The vires of sub-section (6) has not
been under challenge
and, therefore, both the provisions in Section 5 have to be construed
keeping the legislative intention in view. We are of the view that
what we have indicated above brings out the true legislative
intention and the prescription in sub-section (2) and the exemption
in sub-section (6) are rationalized."
Upholding this totally, the
Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
(1997), while dealing with the issue of appointment of Administrative
Members, concluded as --
"95. We are also required
to address the issue of the competence of those who man the Tribunals
and the question of who is to exercise administrative supervision
over them. It has been urged that only those who have had judicial
experience should be appointed to such Tribunals. It has been pointed
out that Administrative Members who have been appointed have little
or no experience in adjudicating such disputes. The Malimath
Committee has noted that at times IPS officers have been appointed to
these Tribunals. It is stated that in the short tenures that these
Administrative Members are on the Tribunal, they are unable to attain
enough experience in adjudication and in cases where they do acquire
the ability, it is invariably on the eve of the expiry of their
tenure. Fore these reasons, it has been urged that the appointment of
Administrative Members to Administrative Tribunals be stopped. We
find it difficult to accept such a contention. It must be remembered
that the setting up of these Tribunals is founded on the premise that
specialist bodies would, by virtue of their specialized knowledge, be
better equipped to dispense speedy and efficient justice. It was
expected that a judicious mix of Judicial Members and those with
grass-root experience would best serve this purpose. To hold that the
Tribunal should consist only of Judicial Members would attach the
primary basis of the theory pursuant to which they have been
constituted. Since the Selection Committee is now headed by a Judge
of the Supreme Court, nominated by the Chief Justice of India, we
have reason to believe that the Committee would take care to ensure
that Administrative Members are chosen from amongst those who have
some background to deal with such cases."
The subject again came up in
State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. B.R. Thakare & Ors. - 2002(1) SCSLJ
25 wherein their lordships once again held,
“It is thus clear that even
at the suggestion of Senior Counsel who urged that Section 5(6)
should mean to cover a Judicial Member only, the Apex Court has not
been ready and did not consider this view to be appropriate to adopt.
On the other hand, they found it sufficient for safeguarding the
interests of claimants going before the Tribunal to hold that:-
"........while allocating
work to the Single Member – whether judicial or administrative –
in terms of sub-section (6), the Chairman should keep in view the
nature of the litigation and where questions of law and for
interpretation of constitutional provisions are involved they should
not be assigned to a Single Member. In fact, the proviso itself
indicates Parliament's concern to safeguard the interest of claimants
by casting an obligation on the Chairman and Members who hear the
cases to refer to a regular bench of two members such cases which in
their opinion require to be heard by a bench of two Members. We would
like to add that it would be open to either party appearing before a
Single Member to suggest to the Member hearing the matter that it
should to to a bench of two Members. The Member should ordinarily
allow the matter to go a bench of two Members when so requested. This
would sufficiently protect the interests of the claimants and even of
the administrative system whose litigations may be before the Single
Member for disposal. To make a distinction between Judicial Member
and Administrative Member functioning under Sub-section (6) of
Section 5 of the Act may not be appropriate and, therefore, we have
not been able to accept the approach suggested by Mr. Ramamurthi. The
observation made in the two-judge Bench case that no provision was
cited to them that a Single Member could hear cases laid before the
Tribunal led to the conclusion that the judicial business of the
Administrative Tribunal was intended to be carried out by a bench of
two Members. The vires of sub-section (6) has not been under
challenge and, therefore, both the provisions in Section 5 have to be
construed keeping the legislative intention in view. We are of the
view that what we have indicated above brings out the true
legislative intention and the prescription in sub-section (2) and the
exemption in sub-section (6) are rotationalized."
Thus, the Apex Court has not
approved the interpretation that the constitution of a Single Bench
of Judicial Member alone should be allowed. The Apex Court has
clearly laid down "as a ratio of dicidendi that when before
single Bench consisting of an Administrative Member the question of
law and its interpretation in the context of constitutional
provisions is in issue, the matter should not be assigned to a Single
Member. Accordingly, the above decision does not distinguish between
a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member and uniformly applies
to both the categories in so far as complex nature of question of law
and interpretation of certain constitutional provisions are
concerned. A deemed reference is that except two categories referred
to above, a Judicial as well as an Administrative Member are
competent to constitute a Single Bench and also within the
jurisdiction to decide the matters.
In concluding, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court set aside the order passed by an Administrative Member
on the ground that firstly the notification of the Chairman of MPAT
to delegate All powers of the Tribunal to a single member was
questionable as it did not account for the safeguards mentioned in
the proviso of sec 5(6), and the Administrative member who passed the
order sitting as a single member in any case had no authority under
the said notification of the Chairman.
This judgement thus makes it
clear that their lordships have gone by the view of the
Constitutional bench in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India &
Ors. (1997), in reiterating that there is no distinction between the
powers of a member (J) and member (A) while sitting as a single
member, when care is taken as per the proviso of sec 5(6)
However, relying on the above
judgment the Hon'ble igh Court of Karnataka & the High Court of
West Bengal at Calcutta have remanded the cases decided by an
Administrative Member sitting as a single member bench, questioning
his competency to decide a matter. With due respect to the HC bench,
it is our considered opinion that their lordships have gone beyond
the view held by the Constitutional bench of the Apex court and
further ignored that even if the case State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
B.R. Thakare & Ors. is to be construed as rejecting the
jurisdiction of member (A), the facts were peculiar only to that
case.
The decision of the two High
Courts have resulted in a piquant situation giving rise to a
contention whether the notification of Hon'ble Chairman dated
December 18, 1991, stands partially nullified so far as the Benches
of Bangalore and Kolkata are concerned and whether the Administrative
Members in these two Benches are precluded from deciding the cases
falling within the subjects covered in the notification of the
Hon'ble Chairman, dated December 18, 1991. Fortunately in other
Benches, so far there are no such fetters on the powers of the
Administrative Members.
The CAT, as on date, serves as
an effective mechanism for redressal of the grievances of the
membersw of the following services.
(A) All India Services – 4
(B) Other services regulated
by the Central Government – 46
© Other services
covered by the Central Civil Services Rules – 20
(D)
Corporations/Societies and other organizationswhich come under the
purview of the CAT under Section 14 of the Act – 202.
All this is not to mention a
large number of establishments that have been brought under the
provisions of State Administrative Tribunals.
The third issue is about
working of State tribunals. A study of the details of the above
mentioned case law of L. Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India reported in
JT 1997(3) SC – 589, throws light on the impressions created in the
mind of the Hon'ble judges about the functioning of the
Administrative Tribunals. Without any exception, all the Members of
the Bar arguing before the Bench and expressed a view that the
functioning of the Tribunals leave much to be desired.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred at length to the report of Justice
V.S. Malimath Committee on the functioning of the Administrative
Tribunals in which Hon'ble Justice Malimath has elaborately discussed
the short- falls in the functioning of the Tribunals. He has
concluded that "Tribunalization of justice in our country is not
satisfactory and encouraging."
Although, there is no internal
evidence to prove our point, it seems to us that the adverse
observations and comments that are raised in the Justice Malimath's
report and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.
Chandrakumar's case arose out of a poor performance of some of the
State Administrative Tribunals. The following observation of Justice
Malimath Committee report which has been extracted by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case referred to above is revealing:-
"The decision of the
State Administrative Tribunals are not appealable except under
Article 136 of the Constitution. On account of the heavy cost and
remoteness of the forum, there is virtual negation of the right of
appeal. This has led to denial of justice in many cases and
consequential dissatisfaction. There appears to be a move in some of
the States where they have been established for their abolition."
In this context, it may be
noted that in some States the State Administrative Tribunals have
been wound up following the decision by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
L. Chandrakumar's case. These State Governments observed that by
reintroducing the jurisdiction of High Courts over the matters in
which the State Administrative Tribunals alone had jurisdiction
hitherto entails an additional financial burden to the parties
thereto, besides dragging the litigation further. It is possible that
these states also found that the performance of the State
Administrative Tribunals was not quite satisfactory. A joke is told
about the UPAT that they decided to summon the Chief Secretary,
whereopon the government promptly decided to take away the powers of
contempt from them.
We did not come across any
such adverse observation made by the Justice Malimath Committee or by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case about the functioning of
the CAT or State Tribunals. If someone will study the statistics of
the writ of appeals before the High Courts and the Supreme Court
where the decisions of the Tribunals were upheld, then alone we will
know the percentage of confirmation of the decisions rendered by
Tribunals which we feel, will be very high. Such incidence of
confirmation of the decisions of the Tribunal will be a great
indicator of efficacy, success of the justice rendering mechanism of
the Tribunals. We are not aware if any such statistics are available
in the DoPT or any other forum, but, we strongly feel that such a
mechanism should be created.
In the
history of CAT, two core issues come up – one of which was about
the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts. Another was the issue
regarding the disposal of cases by a Single Member Bench.
As
back as in 1991 the then Chairman of CAT has looked into the question
of categorization of cases appearing before the CAT and prescribed
guidelines
as to what type of cases can be brought and heard before a Single
Member Bench. He was careful to include a comprehensive guideline to
say that when the parties apply for a case to be heard by a Division
Bench, then so shall be done. Also, later in the case of ...........
Ram Vs. ICAR, their lordships in case No................... have held
that there is no bar on a Single Member Bench hearing and disposing
the cases except when there is an issue of constitutional
interpretation. This was further quoted in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. UOI
in Ors. In which their Lordships held that the vires of Sec. 5(6) is
not questionable. However, precaution must be taken that when a
question of constitutional interpretation comes, the matter must be
referred to a Division Bench of the Tribunal.
Subsequently, another case became important in the history of CAT
namely ..............Govt. of MP Vs. Thakre & Ors. The case is
interesting enough to merit some details at this juncture. First of
all, it arose not from any application decided by CAT but from an
application decided by MPAT. Therein the Chairman of MPAT had
previously issued a notification authorizing Member (Judicial) of
MPAT to exercise all the powers of the State Tribunal itself When the
case of Shri Thakre & Ors. Came up, it was heard by another
Member (Administration) sitting single who disposed it. Hence, the
main issue before the Apex Court was whether the said order was
ab-initio ultra vires. While deciding the matter, their Lordships
came across two issues -
(a) Whether the authority of
the Tribunal can at all be delegated to a Single Member Bench?
(b) When it is delegated to
one particular Member (Judicial), whether a Member (Administration)
can exercise the authority?
Without any need to go into
first question, their Lordships have set aside the decision of MPAT
on the ground that the matter was disposed of by a Single Member
(Administration), who was not authorized by Chairman.
It is pertinent to note that
in the said judgment although their lordships have recorded that the
quashing of the orders is not merely on the ground that the Chairman
had not authorized the Administrative Member. On the other hand, in
case of CAT, the notification issued about Single Member Bench cases,
no distinction has been made between a Member (Judicial) and a Member
(Administration) and this position has been upheld in the case of L.
Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India & Ors. Hence, the CAT has to take
up a categorical stand in the issues raised by the subsequent
judgments of High Courts of Karnataka and Kolkata.
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