CENTRAL
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
BANGALORE
BENCH : BANGALORE
ORIGINAL
APPLICATION NO.162 / 2009
TODAY,
THIS THE DAY OF
................. , 2011
HON'BLE
SMT. LEENA MEHENDALE ...MEMBER(A)
HON'BLE
SHRI V.AJAY KUMAR ...MEMBER(J)
C. Nagappan,
S/o Chinnannan, Aged 59 years,
Working as Chief Accounts Officer (OPC),
O/o the Area Manager (South East),
Bangalore Telecom District,
Bangalore-560 082. ... Applicant
(By
Advocate Shri A.R. Holla)
Vs.
1. Union of India by Secretary,
Ministry
of Communications and IT,
Department of Telecommunications,
Sanchar
Bhavan, No.20, Ashoka Road,
New Delhi
– 110 001.
2. Member (Finance),
Telecom
Commission,
Room
No.915, Sanchar Bhavan,
No.20,
Ashoka Road, New Delhi – 110 001.
3. Chief General Manager, Telecom,
Karnataka
Circle,
No.1,
Swami Vivekananda Road,
Halasuru,
Bangalore-560 008. ... Respondents
(By
Advocates S/Shri M. Rajakumar, ACGSC for R-1 & 2 and
V.N.
Holla, ACGSC for R-3 )
O R D E R
Hon'ble Smt. Leena Mehendale, Member (A) :
This OA has been filed on 01.04.2009
under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It pertains to a disciplinary proceeding, and
imposition of the penalty of reduction by one stage in time scale of pay for
one year with cumulative effect. Appeal
filed has also been rejected.
2. The impugned orders are at Annexure -A4
Order No.8-159/2001 - Vig.II dated 15.06.2007 by the Disciplinary Authority and
at Annexure-A/7 Order No.
1-28/2008-Vig.III dated 09.03.2009 by the Appellate Authority. The
prayer is to quash the above said impugned orders and to direct the respondents
to expunge Memorandum dated 05.03.2007 (Annexure-A/2) and to grant
consequential benefits.
3. The chronology of the case is that the
applicant was working in the department of Telecommunication as Senior Accounts
Officer in the office of the DGM (Deputy General Manager) Rural, Bangalore
Telecom District, during the year 1998 - 1999.
It is alleged that he colluded with one Shri Raghu Section Supervisor
(S.S) working in the same office and leaked the secret supervisory password
(SSP for short) and caused a loss of Rs.2.5 lakhs to the Department of
Telecom. The Memo with the above
allegation was given to him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 on
16.03.2006 which itself is after 7-8 years.
The single charge is as under:-
That the
said Sri C.Nagappan while functioning as Senior Accounts Officer, Office of the
Deputy General Manager (Rural), Bangalore Telecom District, Bangalore during
period 1998-99 committed gross official misconduct and dereliction of duty in
as much as colluded with Sri D.Raghu, Section Supervisor in the same office and
leaked the secret supervisory passowrd
and thereby caused a loss of Rs.2.5 lakhs to the Department of Telecom. Though he was well aware that using the
particular supervisory password allotted to him anybody can amend the urban
data without using the system available in computer billing centre, Vijayanagar,
he did not take any precaution to check the leakage of this supervisory
password and allowed his subordinate officials to operate the system at their
own without his presence.
2.
Thus, by his above said acts, the said Sri
C.Nagappan committed grave misconduct, failed to maintain absolute, integrity
and devotion to duty, and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant
thereby contravening Rule 3 (1) (i), 3(1) (ii) & 3 (1) (iii) of CCS
(CONDUCT) Rules, 1964"
4. The applicant denied the charges and an
inquiry was ordered and the report of the Inquiry Officer shows that the charges were held as not
proved. A copy of the Inquiry Report
was given to the applicant on 05.03.2007 by the Disciplinary Authority
(Respondent No.2), mentioning that the Disciplinary Authority has not agreed
with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and directs the applicant to submit
explanation.
5. The applicant submitted his explanation
on 28.03.2007 which was considered by the Disiciplinary Authority who, however,
in disagreement with the findings of the I.O. concluded that the charges are
proved and the misconduct of the applicant has resulted in the loss of Rs.2.5
lakhs. Therefore, order was passed on 15.06.2007 (Annexure-A/4) imposing penalty of reducing his pay by one
stage in the time scale of pay for a period of one year with immediate
effect. It also directed that the
applicant would not earn his increment during the period of such reduction and,
on expiry of the period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing the
future increments of his pay.
6. The applicant preferred an appeal (Copy
at Annexure-A/5) requesting to set aside the order of punishment. The Appellate Authority is President of India
on his behalf Respondent No.1 has to consider and decide the appeal. The said appeal remained pending for a long
time which necessiated the applicant to approach this Tribunal in
O.A.298/08. The Tribunal directed
Respondent No-1, to decide the appeal within 3 months. Finally the Respondent No.-1, after taking
the advice from the UPSC, rejected the appeal (Annexure-A/7). Hence this OA is filed. In the meantime, the
applicant has retired on 30.06.2008.
7. Before going into the pleadings, we
would make following observations of technological nature. The Bangalore Rural Telecom District,
consisted of rural areas of Bangalore District, and in addition, 5 urban
exchanges namely Whiteffield, Hebbagudi,
Electronic City, Yelahanka and
K.R.Puram were also allotted to the same rural district. By way of local arrangement, the staff of Bangalore rural was updating the
data pertaining to these 5 urban exchanges by coming over to the CBC (Computer
Billing Centre), Vijayanagar. This created
some problems. So, the two computer
systems of the Rural District and the Vijayanagar centre were
inter-linked. Thus, both the systems
could be accessed, used or modified by any one who had the password for
system. Hence, following crucial points
emerge:-
7.A. The case of the applicant is that there
were in fact, two passwords. One could
be used to access the Urban Exchanges along with some of the Rural Exchanges
(this was popularly known as ORACLE password) and the second password could
access the remaining Rural Exchanges. He
claims that he was aware of the existence of the second password and also
admits that this was known to some of the subordinate staff who were actually
engaged in preparing the bills and updating the data such as previous meter
reading, current meter reading, revenue collection, customer care, etc., for
rural areas. He, however, denies the
knowledge of the first password, namely, the ORACLE password. On the other hand, the Disciplinary Authority
appears to be under assumption that there is only one password for the entire
combination of all Rural District plus 5 Urban Exchanges. This aspect has not been clarified throughout
the inquiry.
7.B. On procedural side, the crux of the case is
that the I.O. has come to the conclusion that the charge is not proved. The I.O. has broken the charge in 3 parts,
viz., (a) collusion with Shri D. Raghu, S.S., (b) leaking the password and (c)
causing a loss of Rs.2.5 lakhs and has held that no evidence was led to
substantiate the charge of collusion with Raghu, no modus operandi of
manipulation of records was discussed or substantiated despite 81 documents
produced by the department during the inquiry, and no details examined to come
to the conclusion of a loss of Rs.2.5 lakhs.
There is also no record to prove when the password was communicated to
the applicant and by whom. Disagreeing
with these findings of IO, the Disciplinary Authority has interpreted the
deposition of PW-15, PW-3 and PW-1 differently and come to the conclusion of
charge being proved.
7.C. The third important question in this case
is how a manipulation of the bills is detected.
We were informed that the date of possible manipulation is indicated by
any bill cancelled or modified on that date.
The applicant has been able to point out from the office records
produced before the I.O. that some cancellation orders were issued on 1.6.98,
i.e., before he joined on 8.6.98 and some on 20.11.99, i.e., after his relief
from the post on 27.7.99. Therefore,
during the inquiry, he demanded some more records of cancellation going back to
earlier dates or later dates. But, this
request was rejected in consultation with the D.A.
8. Since 7.A (supra) requires an
understanding of technological details, it was agreed by both the counsels
during hearing that some senior technical offcials of the Telecom department
may be asked to appear before the Tribunal and they may explain the
situation. We have recorded on
01.04.2011 as follows:
"Shri
P.Janardhana Aithala, DGM and Shri Anand
B.Rohidekar, Chief Accounts Officer, both belong to Bangalore Telecom Division and
are present to assist the Bench to explain the procedure for giving the Pass
Word to the concerned officers. Shri
Rohidekar explains that Bangalore has 8 Area Offices out of which one is Rural
Area Office and 7 are Urban Area Offices.
However, some parts of the Rural Area Office which fall under its
functional jurisdiction are not connected with the urban server. This was the position in 1998-99 although
this is not the position now. Therefore
in those days the in-charge Sr.AO was
given one ORACLE pass word with which he
can access to rural system and this pass word was given by the IT
Administration to the rural system.
However for the purpose of billing the other rural areas falling in his
jurisdiction but connected to the urban system has a different pass word to be
given to him by the IT Administration handling urban system. Shri Rohidekar also explains that when ever a
pass word is given to a new comer, an entry is noted in the register. It will not show the actual pass word but
will show a mention that such officer has been given a pass word to access the
concerned system on such a date. He
further explains that he does not know whether those registers pertainiong to
1998-99 will be available now for perusal.
He further explains that such registers are maintained and the current
register can be seen if any more clarifications are needed. On the question as to how any manipulation
can be detected, he explains that every customer is given a hard copy of the
bill. Therefore, if on any complaint, it
is found that the bills shown in the hard copy is different from the bill
amount shown in the computer system, then
it will be an indication of any manipulation. After getting these clarifications, the two
concerned officers are discharges with thanks".
(Incidentally, Shri Rohidekar is also PW-3 in this D.E. And a technical
hand)
9. We have heard both the counsels and
gone through the records produced by them and we can quickly come to see how
the IO, DA and AA have dealt with the matter.
Normally, the Tribunal is not to reappreciate the evidence and sit as
Appellate Authority. However, here we
are required to look into it because the DA has differed with IO without
dealing with relevant issues raised by IO.
10. As discussed in para 7.B supra, the IO
has come to the conclusion that the charge not proved for the four reasons
mentioned therein. The IO has also
discussed in detail the evidence given by 5 prime witnesses viz., PW-14, PW-15,
PW-3, PW-1 and PW-4. We find PW-14 Smt.
Lakshmi Bai, SS, stating that the post of Sr.AO was held successively by Shri
Ramachandra, Shri Ganesh, Shri Krishnamurthy and Shri Nagappan, the
applicant. During all this period, Rural
billing password was known to her and another SS Smt. Sumana and AO,
Rural. The Rural billing password was
often changed. However, the billing of
the Rural exchanges attached to Bangalore Urban was done at CBC and she did not
know who was modifying the data of those exchanges.
11. PW-15 Smt. Sumana, deposed that she was
dealing with sub-ledger and all the rent assistants were operating the computer
system installed in Rural office. After
relief of Shri C.K. Ramachandra, herself and Smt. Lakshmi Bai were logging in
the system by typing the password. The
password was given to her by the respective AOs.
12. It is further seen from the cross
examination of these two, as quoted by the applicant in his representation to
the DA - (Annexure-A/3) that
"During
cross examination she has stated that two passwords were given to her one for
Rural billing and second for herself and stated further that the password for
Rural billing had no access to Urban numbers."
PW-1, Shri
Ravi, GM, Finance, deposed that AO Rural was given a password for logging into
the main computer for billing requirement of Rural areas connected to Urban
OMC. Thus, we find the first clue about
the possible existence of two passwords from the deposition of PW-14 and PW-15
and PW-1. This tallies with the
information supplied to us at para 8 supra.
13. PW-3, Shri Rohidekar, Senior AO, CBC,
Vijayanagar deposed that bill processing was done by CBC but other related
inputs were being managed by Rural office.
This was possible by linking the two systems. Thus, anyone in Rural office knowing ORACLE
password could amend the data at CBC. In
cross examination (as quoted in Annexure-A/3), he has also stated that he could
not tell to whom separate user account was provided. We note that he joined the office two months
after the applicant joined. We also note
that though a technical hand, he has not given any information to IO about
existence or otherwise of two passwords.
14. PW-1 stated that he could not tell the
date on which the password was given nor the specific person to whom it was
given because the allotment of password to various Accounts Officers was
handled not by him but by Chief Accounts Officer of CBC.
15. Thus, we observe that he had no first
hand knowledge of the password having been given to the applicant. But, the fact that the AO of Rural Areas was
accessing the Urban CBC was a proof that the password was known.
16. The IO has further noted from the
evidence of PW-1 that
"To a
question by D A regarding assessment of loss to Department was Rs.80,000/- only
during the charged official's period whereas the loss for the earlier and later
period worked out to Rs.1.64 lakhs. As per Article of Charge loss attributed to
the Charged Official was Rs.2.5 lakhs and whether this was verified when the
Charged Official was not in charge, he replied that it is not expected at the
level of GM (Finance) to verify this."
17. From the report of the IO at
Annexure-A/2, the explanation of the applicant given to DA at Annexure-A/3 and
order passed by the DA at Annexure-A/4, it seems that apart from PW-14 and 15,
who were very junior employees and spoke of a possibility of 2 different
passwords for 2 systems, no-one at a senior level has bothered to understand or
verify the existence of two passwords and the implication of the same. The IO has rightly assessed the matter on the
exact wording of the charge sheet and has concluded the charge as not
proved. The DA, who was differinmg from
the IO's report, had the onus of discussing this technological issue as to how
exactly the billing at the two exchanges was done, whether they were accessed
through a single or two passwords, what kind of password protection was
available and how and when such password was given to whom. Since the DA has relied so heavily on the
evidence of PW-15, it was necessary to look at the full evidence given by PW-15
and the linked evidence of PW-14. The
DA has simply relied on one sentence,
namely,
"Prosecution witness 15, Smt.
Sumanna, in her deposition during inquiry, has deposed that password was given
to her by the CO (Charged Officer) and she as well as other staff were working
on the system by themselves."
The DA has
overlooked remaining part of evidence given by PW-15 that the Rural billing
password was known to the Rural billing staff much before and also that when
the Urban CBC was linked, the password needed for linking to the Urban system
was not given to her and she had no access to the Urban system. The DA therefore, also had the responsibility
to go into one more aspect. It is seen
from the record that by way of local arrangement, the staff of Bangalore Rural
was updating the data pertaining to the 5 Urban Exchanges by coming to the CBC,
Vijayanagar. When the AO, Rural,
expressed difficulties to send the staff and requested to link the Vijayanagar
system to the Rural Exchange, the request was rejected. But, when the Chief Accounts Officer, Rural
Exchanges also made same complaint and the same request, the two systems were
linked. Hence, the IO has correctly
raised questions in the report as to (a) who was the Chief AO who requested the
separate password, (b) when the separation order was given, (c) when was the
password given anew to the Urban linked Rural Exchange, (d) who was the
recipient. Further, (e) who was the AO
in the CBC who gave the password, (f) whether the same was given in writing or
orally and (g) who was the AO in CBC who gave the password to the applicant and
on what date. Despite the IO holding
that these questions are crucial but have remained un-answered, the DA has held
that the password was given to the applicant and was leaked by him.
18. The DA has also relied on the deposition
of PW-3, who is a technically knowledgable person about computers, but, had
joined CBC after the applicant started his work at Bangalore Rural
District. DA has pointed at -
"anyone
in Rural office knowing the ORACLE password could amend the data at CBC. He (PW-3) also states that he being fresh in
CBC did not know much details about the management and security of the
password"
Thus, we
see that the DA has solely relied (as stated in para 5 of Annexure-A/4) on the
statement of Smt. Sumana, PW-15 that after relieving of Shri Krishnamurthy, AO,
Shri Nagappan, new AO, gave her the new password for Rural billing and this
password was different from earlier password but, has ignored other part that
this password could not access urban system.
19. On the whole, we find that the order of
the DA does not clearly bring out the technicalities involved, nor, as pointed
by the IO, the modus operandi of bill cancellation. The DA has also completely missed out to
mention anything about Raghu, with whom the applicant is alleged to have
colluded. Even assuming that the
applicant leaked the password to PW-15, nothing has been brought on record to
show how it reached Raghu. We find no
attempt of any charge-sheet against Raghu, who is also an employee of the
Department and we also find no explanation about the bill cancellation or bill
modification done before or after the period of the applicant.
20. As far as the Appellate Authority is
concerned, it is seen that the order of Respondent No.1, Secretary to the
Department, is extremely short and relies solely on the advice of the UPSC and
it has not gone into the details of the case, leave alone the details of
technological aspects which has been brought out by the applicant in his Appeal
memo dated 16.07.2007 mentioning categorically that the practice of
cancellation and changes of the billing that were carried out in those 5
exchanges of Bangalore urban was existing prior to his joining to that post and
continued even after his relieving from
the post. In the appeal, the applicant
has pointed out that PW-1, deposed initially that secret pass word was given to
the applicant but has withdrawn that statement during the cross examination and
admitted that the whole affair of secret password allotment was handled by CAO,
CBC and not by PW-1. To a specific question whether the password
was given to Rural AO before the applicant joined the post, the PW-1 had said
no, but, the sample data of cancellation revealed that cancellations existed
prior to the joining of the applicant.
This fact is a pointer that PW-1 had little knowledge about the password
management and its security controls.
Further, PW-3 has also not deposed that the secret supervisory pass word
was given to the applicant. In the Appeal memo at Annexure-A/6. The applicant has once again claimed a
distinction between the password for Rural area and a different password for
Urban-linked-rural areas. This has also
not been examined by the Appellate Authority.
We find that the Appellate Authority has not gone into any details but has simply relied on the grounds urged by
the Disciplinary Authority and concurred by the UPSC.
21. We therefore, find merit in the OA. The DA, when disagreeing with the finding of
the IO, must discuss fully all the reasons on the basis of which the IO has
come to the conclusion of not proved.
These reasons were suscinctly framed by the IO and discussed as observed
by us at para 7.1 (supra). The DA has
not bothered to touch upon those discussions at all. Simply coming to the conclusion that since
the lower clerks such as PW-14 and PW-15 were in the knowledge of the password,
therefore, the charge of collusion, manipulation and loss to the department are
proved against the applicant is not sufficient.
The AA has also not discussed in detail the issued raised by the
applicant. Hence, we have no hesitation
to quash both these orders.
22. Before parting, it is worth mentioning
that this case revealed that the middle level officers of the department, viz.,
the AO, Sr.AO, CAO and otehr officers of that rank needed a training from time
to time about their supervisory role. In
the instant case too, the applicant may or may not have personally received the
password and may not have personally leaked it.
Yet, it is definitely the
supervisory role of him, the CAO and other seniors to find out how the
subordinate billing clerks are doing the billing. If there is a password security, how does it
function, who has the knowledge of password and how to conduct occassional
randon inspections to ensure that there is no misuse. Such understanding of the supervisory role is
the essential part of nuts and bolts of the working in the department, and we
felt it was lacking.
23. Hence, While holding that the two
impugned orders declaring the applicant guilty of charges are not maintainable,
we also feel it necessary to mention that a training for proper supervision was
ignored. Not just PW-1, who is GM,
Finance or Presenting Officer, even the IO, DA and AA have not discussed
exactly how the password security worked.
To avoid such situations in future, it is necessary that in-service
training should be strengthened whenever a new technology is introduced. Even otherwise as a routine maintenance
practice of the department training is needed.
It is worth stating that adequate regular maintenance is required not
only for the machines but also for human resources in the department.
24. In view of the foregoing, the OA is
allowed and the impugned orders at Annexures-A/4 and A/7 are quashed. Consequently, the applicant is entitled to
all consequential benefits. The
respondents are directed to pay all the dues to the applicant within four
months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.
(V. AJAY
KUMAR) (LEENA
MEHENDALE)
MEMBER (J) MEMBER (A)
psp.
8. The applicant has argued the OA through
the learned counsel that his prayer deserves merit on several procedural as
well as technical grounds.
(a) First of all the allegation pertains to
the period 1998 - 1999 but the charge sheet was served on him on
16.03.2006. In between the applicant had
been transferred from Bangalore to Junagadh in 2002 and was brought back to Bangalore in June,
2006.
(b) The applicant has worked as SAO (Senior
Accounts Officer) in Bangalore Rural District from 08.06.1998 to
27.06.1999. From the details of enquiry,
it can be seen that manipulation of (SSP-secret supervisory password) may have
been going on from 01.06.1998 till 22.11.1999 which is 8 days prior to his
taking over charge and 5 months after
handing over charge and hence the manipulation was not done by the applicant
but by some other person. However, there
has neither been any inquiry against the said Shri D.Raghu nor any attempt to
recover the monetary loss that have been incurred. (Here we note that the date of possible
manipulation is indicated if a bill has been corrected by an order passed on
that day).
9. In addition to above,
the applicant has pleaded a basic technological issue, and we find it necessary
to go into its details. The applicant's
version of it is as under:- Even though
the Inquiry Officer has held the charges as not proved, the D.A (Disciplinary
Authority) has disagreed with that finding because the D.A. has failed to
appreciate the Inquiry Report as well as the contention of the applicant.
Accordingly, the D.A. has asked his explanation on following among other
points:-
"Prosecution
witness 15, Smt Sumanna, in her deposition during inquiry, has deposed that
password was given to her by the CO and she as well as other staff were working
on the system by themselves. Further, PW
3 Shri Anand B Rodhikar, SrAO, in his deposition during inquiry has stated that
separate user account was provided for rural office through which they were
operating. Security control was being
done through allotment of password for each user. As rural office account existed on CBC
system, all the labels of BGTD were accessible through this. Anyone in the rural office knowing this
oracle user password can amend the data at CBC.
As per deposition of PW.I, Shri G.Ravi, GM(Finance), the charged Officer
was allotted the password. From the
statement of these witnesses, it is clear that CO was allotted password for
accessing rural office account on CBC system and all levels of BGTD were
accessible through this account. CO
failed to maintain secrecy of this password and this was made known to the
officials working under him. Leakage of
password allotted to CO resulted in manipulation of urban telephone bills. Thus charge is proved against Shri
C.Nagappan".
10. The applicant has tried
to inform this distinction between the SSP which he has not been given and the
billing password for rural areas – (para 4.3 of OA).
"There
is a distinction between the 'billing password' used for billing of Bangalore
Rural exchanges and the 'secret supervisory password' used for billing the 5
Urban telephone exchanges at Computer Billing Centre, Vijayanagar. This 'secret supervisory password' has been
referred to as 'oracle password' also in the proceedings. What the applicant has given to his
subordinates was the 'billing password' used for Bangalore Rural exchanges, to
discharge their duties. There is
absolutely no complaint about the same because the applicant was working as
Senior Accounts Officer in the Bangalore Rural Telephone District at that point
of time. So far as the allegation that
he leaked the secret supervisory password' given to billing in the 5 Bangalore
Urban exchanges is concerned, the applicant submits that it is not true because
he was not aware of the said 'secret supervisory password'. When he is not aware of the 'secret supervisory
password' himself, the question of leaking the same to his subordinates does
not arise. The applicant submits that
the disciplinary authority has not understood the distinction between the
'billing password' given for the purposes of billing in the Bangalore Rural
exchanges and the 'secret supervisory password', resulting in erroneous
conclusions".
Thus,
the applicant's claim is that the Disciplinary Authority was mistaken in concluding that he had given
secret supervisory password with particular reference to the depositions of the
three witnesses viz.PW1, PW3 and PW15.
It is further pertinent to note that
prosecution witnesses including some of the Senior Officer who deposed before
the Inquiry Officer could not show that
any secret supervisory passwrod was ever
been given to the applicant at all.
We find that the whole emphasis of
argument by the applicant is on
tchnological issue. In addition
we have also dealt with the order of the Appellate Authority who rejected the
appeal and upheld the order of the Disciplinary Authority. The Appellate Authority has also gone by the
advice given by the UPSC which he has
considered as mandatory. The applicant
challenges the decision of the Appellate Authority as well as the advice of the
UPSC on the grounds that
(a) The UPSC has gone strictly
on the report of the Disciplinary
Authority
(b) In upholding that he
disclose the secret supervisory pass word to other official and collude with
Shri D.Raghu and causing a loss of Rs.2.5 lakhs to the department. The UPSC has relied on the Disiciplinary
Authority who in turn has relied on the deposition of the PW-1,2, and 3. Since these
depositions have failed to bring out the distinction between the secret
supervisory pass word and the billing password, all other agencies namely the
Disciplinary Authority is CBI and the UPSC failed to appreciate the
distinction.
The applicant has analysed the
deposition of PW-I Shri G.Ravi, GM Finance who had deposed that the Chief
Accounts Officer of the computer billing
centre had given the SSP to the applicant but could not say when it was
given. PW -3 who is a technician dealing with the pass word
allocation and was then working in the Computer Billing Centre had stated that
the SSP was given to the rural office but has not categorically stated that it
was given to the applicant. He also
could not categorically state the date on which it was gtiven. Further PW-3 Mr Anand B.Rohidekar himself joined his office
in the computer billing centre in the month of August, 1998 whereas the
applicant was already working as Senior Accounts Officer with effect from
09.06.1998. It is therefore obvious that
PW-3 himself could not have given the secret supervisory pass word to the
applicant. Thus all other senior
officers who were examined by the Inquiry Officer have not been able to confirm
that SSP was given to the applicant or on what date it was given or whether any
record is kept for having given.
Adjourned to 11.04.2011"
Against the order passed
by the Appellate Authority the applicant contends only that the same was not in
accordance with the Rule 27 under CCS(CCA) Rules and was inordinately delayed.
We have perused the
Appelalte Authority order para -3 , it
equatted the UPSC
..........Shri
C.Nagappan ......during the period 1998-1999 committed gross official
misconduct and dereliction of duty in as much as he colluded with Shri D.Raghu,
Section Supervisor in the same Office and leaked the secret supervisory
password and thereby caused a loss of Rs,2.5 lakhs to the Department of
Telecom. Though he was well aware that
using the particular supervisory password allotted to him any body can amend
the data without using the particular supervisory password allotted to him
anybody can amend the date ................."
.........After
analysis of the case, UPSC has observed that by CO's own admission and
depositions of prosecution witnesses, it is established that CO was given
supervisory password which he disclosed to his subordinate officials. Further, the Commission has observed that
negligence of CO enabled others with criminal intent to manipulate the system
and cause loss to Department though the CO did not deliberately act in
collusion with the culprits for personal gain.
In the concluding part of its advice, the UPSC has observed that appeal
is devoid of merits and has advised to reject the appeal.
.....Hon'ble
MoS (C&IT), on behalf of Hon'ble President, the Appellate Authority, has
accepted the advice of UPSC on the appeal of Shri C.Nagappan, Sr A.O. The Hon'ble MoS (C&IT), on behalf of
Hon'ble President has therefore ordered to reject the appeal dated 16.07.07
filed by Shri C.Nagappan, Sr.AO., Karnataka Telecom Circle.
.
It is seen that
In the reply statement
as well as during the arguments the learned counsel for the respondents made
the following points:
"Para.4(1): The contention of the applicant in this para
is wrong and denied. The disciplinary
authority had examined the inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer and
disagreed with the IOs report as follows.
"Prosecution Witness.15, Smt Sumanna, in her deposition during
inquiry has deposed that password was given to her by the CO and she as well as
other staff were working on the system by themselves. Further PW-3, Sri Anand B.Rohidkar, Sr, A.O.,
in his deposition during inquiry has stated that separate user account was
provided for rural office through which they were operating, security
controlling being done through allotment of password for each user. As rural office account existed on CBC
system, all the labels of BGTD oracle user password can amend the data of
CBC. As per deposition of PW-I, Sri
G.Ravi, GM (Finance), the charged officer was allotted the password. From the statement of these witnesses, it is
clear that CO was allotted password for accessing rural office account on CBC
system and all labels of BGTD were accessible through this account. CO failed to maintain secrecy of the password
and this was made known to the officials working under him. Leakage of password allotted to CO resulted in manipulation of urban telephone
bills. Thus, the charge is proved
against sri C.Nagappan (applicant)"
The order of this
Tribunal in the earlier O.A.No.738/2004 decided on 18.11.2005 in which it was
held
"(v)Speaking
Order - UPSC Advice-No remarks could be given on UPSC advice as it was supplied only with penalty
notice-The order has not discussed points raised by the applicant-Case of ECIL
relied upon and held the order as bad in law (Para 27) - Also held the
authority was influenced by UPSC advice and has depended on it in his
order-Hence bad."(Paras 28,29)
The Chief Accounts Officer, Rural has expressed
difficulties to send the staff to
Vijayanagar and requested to link the Vijayanagar system with Rural
exchanges. This necessaitated
allottment of SSP secret supervisory password) to the SAO, Rural, for updating
the data pertaining to those 5 urban exchanges.
This Password, often referred to as ORACLE Password was different from
the usual Password given to SAO for computer billing of the other rural areas.
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